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ABSTRACT
   It is common knowledge that Small and Medium enterprises make up the backbone of the Greek 
economy.  Nowadays during  the  greatest post  war  financial  crisis,  the  fund  availability  critically 
determines the survival and the development of almost every enterprise.
   In the first part of this presentation we will refer to the financial crisis in Greece.Apparently one of 
the major economic problems in our country is the widely extended corruption throughout all the 
economic activities including corruption 0n banks.
   In the second part we will present the impact of the recession on the banking sector in local and 
national  level  and the consequences of  the great  reduction of  loan providing  funds to  Small  and 
Medium Enterprises (SMEs). We will present the fact that nowadays, entrepreneurs can not obtain 
loans based on personal guarantee, and they have to offer their own house as collateral. 
   In the third part we will refer to Serres, former prefecture of Greece, where the economic inability 
and underdevelopment to all the levels of local economy is obvious. We will also refer to the fact that 
while  on  turmoil  governments schedule programs using the criterion  of efficiency instead of  the 
criterion of equity. Under these circumstances, the area of Serres will never be developed.
    In  the  forth  part  we  will  present  the  results of the  questionnaire-based  research  from  the  local 
entrepreneurs in the Prefecture of Serres. We will focus on the consequences of a economical crisis. It 
is worth referring to the fact that their answers are similar to those deduced from the results of the 
researches that have been referred to in bibliography.   
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INTRODUCTION
It  is common  knowledge  that  today’s  crisis could  only  be  compared to  the  1929  crisis.  The 
consequences of the turmoil on the banking sector are enormous. 
In the first part we will refer to the crisis in Greece and we will retrospect bankrupts and recessions in 
Greece during the last century. We will also refer to corruption in our country and we will present state 
guarantees towards banks and enterprises. 
In the second part we will present some data from  “Hellenic Statistical Authority” to indicate the 
impact of the crisis on banks on national level. Also we will refer to a local example and to a national 
example. 
In the third part we will present some data mainly from “Serres Chamber of Commerce and Industry”
which indicates the underdevelopment of our area. In additional we will refer to Serres demographic
characteristics.
In the forth part we will present the results of our questionnaire-based research from 74 entrepreneurs 
in Prefecture of Serres. We will focus on the consequences of the recession.
Finally we will end with the main conclusions.4
FIRST PART
FINANCIAL CRISIS AND CORRUPTION IN GREECE 
Our country, Greece, has suffered from 4 bankruptcies in the past (1827, 1843, 1893, 1932) due to 
Greece’s inability to repay the enormous debt. Global international crisis in the year 1929 was by
affected the last bankruptcy (1932). 
It  is noticeable that ten years ago (2000-2001)  a year before Greece’s entrance  to  “Euro  zone” 
Athens’s Stock-market collapsed. The so–called “stock-market bladder” affect investor’s behavior for 
the following years. 
Today’s global credit-finance crisis (2008-2009) has also affected our economy. It is noticeable that 
international crisis in the year 1929 and today’s global crisis both affected credit system and as a 
consequence many banks were bankrupted.
In the table below we portray the global-crisis causes:
Table1: Global-crisis causes
In thetable 2 below we portray the Greece crisis causes:  
Table 2: Greece-crisis causes
Coming to a conclusion, tCrisis in Greece should be characterised as a debt crisis while Crisis in 
United States and in north European Union countries should be characterised as a credit and finance 
crisis. 
Recession could be avoided if an efficiency risk administration existed.
In the table 3 below we portray some characteristics for achieving efficiency risk administration:  
Table 3: Efficiency risk administration 
1. Sub-primes
2. Rising commercial prices
3. Wide use of derivatives
4. Lack of transparency on risks apportionment 
5. Banks  have been undertaken high hazards
6. Hazard’s devaluation by rating institutions
7. Central banks provided over- liquidity
8. Decreasing interests 
9. Infected supervisory frame 
10. Hedge funds
1. Failure in fiscal policy (deficit financing-debt)
2. Lack of plans in production, infrastructure works, education, 
      Social security, tourism, agriculture    
3. Trade deficit
4. Incapability of using monetary devaluation
5. Low effectiveness 
1. timely risk recognition
2. development of evaluation systems
3. reliable measurement 
4. support of  efficiency administration practices
5. pricing credit products according to the undertaken hazards
6. rational  division  (qualitative  and  quantitative)  of  bank’s 
products to corporate and retail
7. surrender of aggressive sales and focus on support liquidity 
and debt arrangements 
      5
By inference, risk administration precedes in imperativeness in order to pass from today’s efficiency 
practises (doing things well) to effectiveness practises (doing the right things).
   Apparently one of the  major  economic  problems in Greece  is the widely extended  corruption 
throughout all the economic activities. According to Doole & Lowe (2005) “In cultures which view 
bribery as an acceptable business practice, the communication style is more implicit…….In Japan, for 
example, gift giving practices are wide spread in the business culture…..By contrast, in Northern 
Europe and the USA managers relay on explicit contract….In some cultures all business gifts are
viewed as illegal bribes” (p. 321). Apparently, although Greece belongs in West, in Europe, Greek 
practises adopt ateastern ones.
  As Greece is considered to be one of the “P.I.(I).G.S” in Euro zone, wide corruption takes place 
almost everywhere –including corruption in state banks. In the forth part of this research, the answers 
to the relevant question “Banks based only on objective and countable criteria toprovide funds for an 
enterprise” 11 up to 16 of the micro enterprises disagreed with this proposal. It is obvious that micro-
entrepreneurs believe that other criteria such as bribe are taken into consideration.
   It is noticeable to refer to state providing guarantees to enterprises. Greek state supports Small and 
medium Enterprises (SMEs) with the application of programmes through guarantees. In Greece, the 
last two years (1-1-2009 up to 7-4-2010) many enterprises took non-interest (at the first Cycle of the 
program) or low-interest (at the second Cycle of the program) loans through Greek Guarantee Fund for 
Small and Very Small Enterprises (TEMPME in Greek language). The main condition of the first 
Cycle is that every enterprise should have 3 profitable financial years in succession during the last 
three years of their profit and loss accounts. As a result of the previous strict condition, micro and new 
enterprises were excluded from the benefit of the non-interest funds. The condition of the second 
Cycle that  every  enterprise should succeed  in achieving a positive profit  mean of their  last  three 
financial years in succession, in their profit and loss accounts finally allowed more business to benefit 
from the low-interest loans.
    We will analyze in the forth part of this research that many businessmen who never received other 
kinds of loans benefit from the non-interest or low-interest loans taking loans from TEMPME. The use 
of non-interest funds by businessmen who never received other kinds of loan did not help liquidity to 
be transferred to real economy. As a consequence to the above, the recession in our country has been 
deteriorated. Taking into consideration the fact that the Greek government is aiming to provide to the 
Greek banks guarantees up to 30 billion Euros, state should reassign the terms of guarantee funds. 
  In addition, it is worth noting the moral hazard due to state guarantees. According to the law, banks 
use the same criteria in order to provide funds for enterprises whether there are guarantees or not.
Unfortunately the banks provide state guarantee funds not only to those enterprises which have the 
ability to repay their debt, (the credible ones) but to almost every enterprise, even those enterprises 
which are likely to go bankrupt. During the summer of 2010, the Greek government provided state 
guarantees to tomato-industries in order to repay the tomato-producer farmers for the year 2009 (that is 
to say tomato-industries owed money to tomato-producer farmers for a period up to a year).  In Serres
alone, the guarantees raised to 5 million Euros as it was published in local newspapers. According to 
recent  Under-Minister  of  Finance  Decision,  due to  financial  recession, tomato  industries have  the 
faculty to regulate these guarantee loans with the term of repaying the loan from the year 2013 up to 
the year 2022 including  period of grace for the years 2011-2012. Taking into account the terms of 
repaying the loans to all the Greek Banks, no bank would ever provide loans to industries such as the 
above described and no bank would ever provide loans with the above terms. 
  Additionally, the inequalities firstly on the fund access and secondly on the loan terms between 
guarantee and non guarantee loans boost corruption in Greece and deteriorate the turmoil. 
   This part ends with the argument of the ex-president of Commercial Union of Serres: “The problem 
which  micro and small  enterprises confront is t he low  consumption  from  our customers  as they 
become poorer. Without increasing customers’ consumption the only real outcome that will occur for 
the enterprises is the increasing debt. This debt under those circumstances would probably never be 
paid-off.”6
SECOND PART
IMPACT  OF  THE  CRISIS  ON  THE  BANKING  SECTOR  IN  LOCAL  AND  NATIONAL 
LEVEL
     It is unanimously agreed that banks provide funds to enterprises and individuals based mainly on 
the criterion of the level of the undertaken risk. Each borrower has to succeed in persuading a bank 
that the undertaken risk, from its loan providing, is acceptable. Turmoil has strongly affected bank 
policy.
The main impact of the crisis on the banking sector is high reduction of the providing loans. Apart 
from the fact that there is an enormous reduction of the total revenue of enterprises, furthermore 
entrepreneurs can not obtain loans based on personal guarantee, and they have to offer their own house 
as collateral.
According to “Bank of Greece” press release (1
st  February 2011): «The annual growth rate of total 
credit granted to the domestic private sector decelerated further to -0.2% in December 2010, from 
0.4% in November 2010 and 4.1% in December 2009. This development reflects the decrease of the 
annual growth rate of credit to enterprises as well as to individuals and private non-profit institutions».
In table1 we depict some data.
Table 1:CREDIT (1),(2)TO THE DOMESTIC PRIVATE SECTOR
               (Outstanding amounts and net flows in EUR millions)
DEC. 2009 OCT. 2010 NOV. 2010 DEC. 2010
Ι. TOTAL
    Outstanding amount of credit 253.379 260.992 261.660 257.127
    monthly net flow 1.888 -661 -835 300
    (%) 12-month change 4,1% 1,0% 0,4% -0,2%
ΙΙ. ENTERPRISES
    Outstanding amount of credit 133.745 126.988 127.588 123.072
    monthly net flow 1.182 -387 -533 488
    (%) 12-month change 5,1% 2,2% 1,6% 1,0%
   1.  Agriculture
         Outstanding amount of credit 3.962 2.051 2.052 2.060
         (%) 12-month change 3,8% 0,8% -0,3% 1,1%
   2.  Industry
         Outstanding amount of credit 23.685 25.542 25.383 24.269
         (%) 12-month change -3,5% -0,8% -1,6% -2,9%
   3.  Trade
         Outstanding amount of credit 33.519 25.663 25.595 25.356
         (%) 12-month change 4,2% -1,9% -1,5% -3,5%
   4. Tourism
         Outstanding amount of credit 7.358 7.237 7.292 7.355
         (%) 12-month change 7,8% 4,3% 3,8% 2,9%
   5. Shipping
         Outstanding amount of credit 10.031 17.141 18.108 17.489
         (%) 12-month change 4,1% 7,4% 7,0% 4,1%
   6. Other financial institutions
         Outstanding amount of credit 6.125 6.408 6.240 6.604
         (%) 12-month change 5,4% 3,7% -1,1% 7,9%
   7.  Construction
         Outstanding amount of credit 11.441 11.216 11.227 11.327
         (%) 12-month change 2,7% 2,7% 1,4% 1,9%
   8.  Electricity - Gas - Water
         Outstanding amount of credit 4.021 4.684 4.621 5.155
         (%) 12-month change 14,7% 23,7% 20,9% 21,6%
   9. Transport services  excl. Shipping7
         Outstanding amount of credit 5.791 5.383 5.331 1.935
         (%) 12-month change 25,5% -0,5% -1,4% -2,7%
  10.  Remaining branches
         Outstanding amount of credit 27.811 21.663 21.739 21.524
         (%) 12-month change 10,3% 4,6% 4,4% 4,2%
ΙΙI. SOLE PROPRIETORS
    Outstanding amount of credit 16.196 16.152 16.233
    monthly net flow -150 -76 69
    (%) 12-month change 0,1% -1,0% -0,8%
ΙV. INDIVIDUALS & PRIVATE NON-PROFIT 
INSTITUTIONS
    Outstanding amount of credit 119.635 117.808 117.919 117.823
    monthly net flow 705 -123 -227 -257
    (%) 12-month change 3,1% -0,1% -0,6% -1,4%
   1. Housing loans
        Outstanding amount of credit 80.559 79.957 80.226 80.429
        monthly net flow 507 -94 -81 -49
        (%) 12-month change 3,7% 0,7% 0,3% -0,4%
   2. Consumer credit
        Outstanding amount of credit 36.044 35.609 35.431 35.068
        monthly net flow 144 -112 -163 -268
        (%) 12-month change 2,0% -2,3% -3,1% -4,2%
   3. Other loans
        Outstanding amount of credit 3.032 2.242 2.263 2.325
        monthly net flow 54 84 16 60
        (%) 12-month change -1,1% 4,3% 3,8% 3,9%
(1) The outstanding amounts include loans, holdings of corporate bonds, as well as securitised loans and corporate 
bonds. In December 2010 the outstanding amounts of credit to specific sectors (industry, transport services excl. 
shipping and remaining branches) have been affected by the reclassification of certain public corporations from the 
private to the genenal government sector, following a relevant decision of ELSTAT (15 November 2010). This 
reclassification does not affect the growth rates and the net flows of credit expansion.
(2) As of June 2010, credit to sole proprietors constitutes a separate category and is not included in credit to enterprises 
in accordance to ESA-95.
Source: Bank of Greece- February2011
It is obvious that banks have reduced the providing funds. For example, the loans in Agriculture sector 
were reduced from 3.962 million Euros in December 2009 to 2.060 million Euros in December 2010. 
That is to say a farmer who could take by the form of working capital 5.000 € now he can take only 
the half (2.500 €). 
In addition, due to real estate price devaluation, individuals who applying for a mortgage loan, either 
they have to have at least the 25% of the home value in cash, or they have to offer and a secondary 
mortgage (for example land). Thus, young couples face difficulties in getting their own house.   
Also,as rubber cheques are increasing due to crisis, entrepreneurs who gave cheques for security, now 
they have to offer more cheques to get the same amount. For example, before the crisis businessmen
offered a 1.000€ cheque to get a loan of 850€, nowadays, they offer a 1.000€ cheque to get a loan of 
750€.
Moreover,  two  years  ago  Greek  banks  gave  loans  (including  working  capitals)  based  only  on 
businessman’s personal guarantee. Case in point was the so called “Smart Business” in ATEbank. 
Businessmen could take up to 50.000 € by making use of this particular product without any security 8
for the debt. Nowadays all these flexible loans have been abandoned. Entrepreneurs ought to offer 
either cheques (with the above described terms) or mortgages as their own house. Besides that, all 
overdrafts have been prohibited.    
Other impact of the crisis on the banking sector is the increasing interest rates. In tables 2 and 3 we 
depict some data. It is noticeable that all loans based only on variable interest rates. Due to insecure 
financial environment, Greek banks have cancelled loan products based on fixed interest rates. 







DEPOSITS  Overnight from households 0.47 0.49 0.50
Overnight from non-financial 
corporations
0.34 0.35 0.36
From households with an agreed 
maturity of up to 1 year  3.68 3.65 3.68
LOANS  Consumer without a defined maturity  14.29 14.41 14.40
Corporate without a defined maturity 6.56 6.62 6.79
To sole proprietors without a defined 
maturity
9.43 9.47 9.57
Corporate with a fixed maturity at a 
floating rate or with an initial fixation 
period of up to 1 year rate:      
-loans up to an amount of EUR 1 
million 







Housing at a floating rate or with an 
initial fixation period of up to 1 year  3.72 3.67 3.65
Housing with an initial fixation period 
of over one and up to 5 years 
3.99 3.95 3.95
Source: Bank of Greece- February2011
Table 3:Average interest rates on outstanding amounts of euro-denominated deposits and loans
October 2010 November 2010 December 2010
DEPOSITS 
From households with an 




corporations with an agreed 
maturity of up to 2 years 
3.67 3.55 3.61
LOANS 
Housing with over 5 years’ 
maturity  3.68 3.68 3.67
Corporate with over 5 years’ 
maturity  4.48 4.68 4.75
To sole proprietors with 
over 5 years’ maturity
5.35 5.42 5.48
Source: Bank of Greece- February2011
The  mentionable  interest  increasing  is  also depicted  on  figure  4 below. ATEbank,  a state bank 
announced  the  huge  interest  rate  increase  (approximately  1%  on  investment  loans  and  working
capitals) last August during summer holidays.9
  Figure 4: Interest rates on euro-denominated loans at ATEbank
                                                  March 2010           February 2011
Housing loans 5,57 6,52
Consumer credit 6,12 6,52
Investment loans 7,62 8,67
short-term loan 7,15 6,67
working capital 6,67% 7,62%
farmer’s working capital 6,12% 6,52%
Source: Agricultural Bank of Greece- February2011
Coming to conclusion, the huge interest rate increase which took place the last twelve months have 
deteriorated turmoil in Greece. 
Finally a different impact of the crisis on the banks is the fact that banks make efforts to reduce their 
cost. We will present two examples for two Greek banks which face difficulties in passing the stress 
tests last July-in fact Atebank failed at the stress test.  The first bank, Agricultural bank of Greece 
(ATEbank) which is characterized as a state bank, decided to reduce services in 50 branches in rural 
areas (3 of them in Former Prefecture of Serres). In order to avoid local villager’s reactions, ATEbank 
announced that during the first stage these bank branches will not provide loans and at the second 
stage (after a year or so) the bank will reconsider if these branches will finally close or not. As we will 
see at the forth part according to local entrepreneurs, the companies which situated near a bank branch 
consider that the existence of a bank branch not only help them but also supports local development. 
As a consequence of the great depression, a state bank, ATEbank is planning to close 10% of its
branches. It is worth referring to one of these branches, the branch of ATEbank at the village Proti 
Serron. Proti is the homeland of 2 former Prime Ministers, both named Konstantinos Karamanlis. The 
first K. Karamanlis was also President for 10 years. In order to reduce cost, ATEbank would probably 
can not even avoid closing even the branch of Proti..Piraeus Bank is facing its financial problems by
initiating a sabbatical leave program for its employees in Greece (approximately 5.000) while this 
program  will  be extended  to  the  rest  8.000 employees  of  the  group  at  a later stage. The bank 
announced  last  November  that  each  employee  will  have  the  option  to  leave  for  1-3  years.  The 
participating employees will receive 40% of their payroll in the first two years and 50% in the third 
year, while their position is guaranteed post the finalization of the sabbatical. Piraeus, through this 
program, aims to achieve the reduction of its cost-base, which is dictated by the challenging operating 
environment. It also avoids layoffs, which would cause reactions from the unions. 
Coming to a conclusion, the main consequence of the turmoil at the banks is the high reduction of 
providing funds either to enterprises or individuals. As banks do not provide the necessary funds to 
enterprises or  individuals,  Greece’  economy  entered to  a vicious cycle of underdevelopment  and 
recession.This part ends with the argument of a local businessman who participated in our research 
last winter. He stated “When sun shined banks gave me an umbrella and all of the sudden when the 
rain starts,banks took the umbrella away.”10
THIRD PART 
RECESSION  ON  FORMER(1) PREFECTURE  OF  SE RRES  –CENTRAL  MACEDONIA-
GREECE
As it is portrayed by the map below, Serres is located at the north Greece, specifically at the Bulgarian 
border. 
The table below depicts the number or enterprises at prefecture of Serres.
Table1
SOURCE: SERRES CHAMBER /JANUARY 2010
The number or enterprises in prefecture of Serres 7 years ago (2004) was 14.156 and the enterprises 
total turnover 6 years ago (2004) was amounted to 1.599.745.459 € and it made up the 0.85% of the 
total revenue in Greece, while the population of Serres is up to 200.000 (2% of the Greek population). 
That is to say, years before the depression, Serres suffered fromunderdevelopment. In communication 
with the members of the “Serres Chamber of Commerce and Industry” the number of enterprises in
former prefecture of Serres has not fluctuated until today (February 2011). Walking in the commercial 
streets in the city of Serres we meet numerous of closed and abandoned shops. The given explanation 
was that enterprises have moved to cheaper streets or businessmen prefer to situate themselves in 
cheaper floor apartments. More specificly, enterprises which provide services can no longer afford the 
high rent of a ground shop. 
We conducted a study on “Ditikis Trhakis” street, a commercial street at the city of Serres before the 
crisis. We found 2 neighbouring shops which closed during the last 6 months. Now, both shops are for 
rent.  The first belonged to a company which sold kitchen cupboards and the second shop belonged to
(1) Until the end of 2010, Greece consisted of 13 administrative  regions  known  as Peripheries of Greece, which are 
further subdivided into 3 super-prefectures and 54 prefectures or counties or Boroughs such as Borough of Serres. 
Recently, from January 2011, Greek government made some serious efforts to shortcut governmental administrative
costs,  through  the  new  legislation  known  as  “Kallikratis”. As a main tool revoke  all prefectures  and  create  13 
administrative regions and named them peripheries. 
NUMBER OF ENTERPRISES AT THE   
PREFECTURE OF SERRES
      COMMERCIAL                             4.180
      SECONDARY INDUSTRY           4.026
      SERVICES                                      5.897
      TOTAL                                          14.10311
a tailor. We interviewed both of the above shop owners. Those who sold kitchen cupboards claimed 
that they forced to move to their private property away from the commercial centre in order not to pay 
rent and the tailor found a better and cheaper place just across the street. Next to the two reffered 
above shops, we found other 6 closed shops which now areoffered for rent.
In addition, it has been formed a status of an abandoned “Industry Zone”. These closed enterprises 
have laid off hundred of employees last year. According to the state of the president of “Labour Centre 
of the Department of Serres” Alkis Apidopoulos:“Labors Force Employment Organization announced 
that unemployment rises on 17.5%. We estimate that real unemployment in our prefecture rises on 
35%”. The president added “Local labours suffer from blackmails and they force to sign new contracts 
based on lower wages. The older workers will replaced by younger ones who are satisfied by lower
salaries. Many enterprises have already hire Bulgarian labors who work uninsured (black work as they 
called  in G reek  language),  while all  but two of  the  local  enterprises  either  they have  reduce  the 
working days, or   they have reduce the working hours per day, or they have reduce the wages.”
It is mentionable to refer to the demographic characteristics of Serres. According to 2001 census (the 
last on Greece) the 53.1 % of Serres are farmers. That is to say they will not starve during the crisis as 
they produce either wheat, or meat, or milk, or fruits as cherries, or vegetables or olive oil. Although 
micro-farmers do not face starvation, they are in fact out of employment as they work less than 200 
hours every year.
Finally,  we  will  end this part  with  a  reference  to  the  connection  between  crisis  and  regional 
development. It is accepted opinion that crisis is deeper at the poor regions of our country. According
to Samir  Amin  (Le  Monde-Diplomatique,  republished  at newspaper  “Ta  Nea”  1993) “funds and 
commercials mobility  is enormous  οn  capitalism  while immigration  is r estricted.  This  situation 
enhances polarity”. The same writer supports on Greek American News Agency (25-10-2008) that 
“Depression  is  unavoidable”.  Eventually,  according  to  Balomenou  (2003) “While  on  scheduling 
programmes for financial development, especially during periods of recession, we should choose the 
criterion <efficiency>” (p.336). Thus the criterion <equity> comes second. As a result to the above,
the underdevelopment area of Serres, regional development will nevertake place. 12
FORTH PART 
QUESTIONNAIRE-BASED RESEARCH ON LOCAL ENTREPRENEURS
  Seventy four entrepreneurs participate in the following research. The research took place from 1-12-
2009 to 12-2-2010. There was wide dispersion, according to the size of the enterprises, so there were 
micro enterprises of self-employed up to medium industries. In additional companies administration 
buildings were situated either in the city of Serres (population 100.000), or in smaller towns of the 
county with population 5.000 to 10.000, or even in very little villages (population less than 1.000). The 
purposes of our research made us not to use the random sampling method. On the contrary, we focused 
on these enterprises which received loans in the form of working capital and also we focused on these 
enterprises which received loans from Greek Guarantee Fund for Small and Very Small Enterprises 
(TEMPME)
The main extracts are the following:
1) Taking under consideration to the fact that the research took place during the winter of 2009-2010, 
before Greece’s referring to the help of International Monetary Fund, the 53% of the businessmen 
considered  that  the  recent  turmoil  has severely affected  their  jobs, the 40%  of the businessmen 
considered that the recent turmoil has affected their jobs and only 7% of the businessmen considered 
that the recent turmoil has not affected their jobs. Businessmen considered that the crisis has not 
affected their jobs, either they sell basic foodstuffs, or they provide services as repairing shoes and 
clothes. 
The results are depicted at the figure 1, below.




Has recent turmoil affected gour job? 
Four months ago, a local entrepreneur who participated in this research, went bankrupt. His industry 
produced  yoghurt and  a variety  of  white  and  yellow  cheeses.  The entrepreneur  commented  that 
“customers buy only 100 grams of cheese while before recession they bought kilos”.
It is noticeable that the enterprises which were not affected from the crisis are all at the stage of 
maturity, while enterprises at the stage of introduction, those at the stage of growth and those at the 
stage of decline have been affected from the crisis. The results are depicted at the figure 2, below.
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Has recent turmoil affected gour job according to the stages of the life
cycle of enterprises?13
We come to the conclusion that crisis affected more intense enterprises at the stage of decline and new 
enterprises.
   It is mentionable that crisis affected more the enterprises situated at towns as New Zihni or city of 
Serres. Enterprises situated at big villages (population up to 1.000) or small villages (population less 
than  1.000)  have  not  been  affected  at  the  same  degree.  We  know  that  crisis  affects  more  the 
underdevelopment areas. The paradox can be explained as there was a lag on crisis’ appearance on 
rural areas (our research took place before Greece’s referring to the help of I.M.F.). In additional, 
Hellenic Statistical Authority announced that 60.000 people returned to their villages last year as in 
villages they do not face starvation. Unfortunately, in Athens and Thessaloniki, the increasing number 
of unemployed leads  to rapidly  increasing poverty.  Eventually, only a few enterprises  have been 
remained at the villages. These few enterprises can de outlasted by the recession. 
The results are depicted at the figure 3, below:
Figure 3: Has recent turmoil affected your job according to where the company’s administration 
buildingssituated?
city of Serres very much 
city of Serres  a little
city of Serres not at all
tovwns  very much 
tovwns   a little
tovwns  not at all
big villages very much 
big villages  a little
big villages not at all
small villages very much 
small villages  a little
small villages not at all
It is noticeable that crisis affected more micro enterprises while small and medium-small enterprises
have not been affected at the same degree. On the contrary, medium enterprises either they suffer from 
the crisis or they became stronger.The results are depicted at the figure 4, below:14
Figure 4: Has recent turmoil affected your job according to the size of the enterprise?
micro enterprises very
much 
micro enterprises  a little




small enterprises  a little
small enterprises not at
all
small-medium
enterprises very much 
small-medium
enterprises  a little
small-medium
enterprises not at all
medium enterprises very
much 




2)  All but one of the enterprises cooperates with a bank and the great majority appears to be satisfied 
with this cooperation. Some entrepreneurs comment that their bank choice is made using the criterion 
of providing to the maximumservice. They added that there are numerous of banks in Greece today to 
choosethe most suitable for them. 
3) The majority (73%) received bank loan in the form of working capital and they believe that this 
method of finance strengthen their jobs. As it is mentioned above we did not use the random sampling 
method as many enterprises in Greece have no access to loans. 
4)  As  it  is m entioned  above  we  did  not  use  the  random  sampling  method. Thus  28  up  to  74 
entrepreneurs received loans through Greek Guarantee Fund for Small and Very Small Enterprises
(TEMPME in Greek language). The majority of those who receive loans from TEMPME believe that 
TEMPME’s  assistance  was  of  critical  importance.  The  50%  of  those  who  receive  loans  from 
TEMPME took loans up to 100.000 €. It has to be pointed out that bigger enterprises (and not the 
micro ones) were those who took the non-interest or low-interest funds.Also, 8 up to 9 entrepreneurs 
who did not manage to benefit from the non-interest or low-interest funds had received other loans. On 15
the contrary, 8 up to 28 entrepreneurs who benefit from the non-interest or low-interest funds have 
never receive any loan at the past. As it is mentioned on the first part, the use of non-interest funds by 
businessmen who never received other kinds of loan did not help liquidity to be transferred to real 
economy. Thus, state should reassign the terms of guarantee funds. 
5) The companies which situated near a bank branch consider that the existence of a bank branch help 
not only them but also supports local development. 
6)  Enterprises at the stage of growth and maturity are those which received the maximum support, 
while state applied a common policy with the banks and was indifferent to the increasing financial 
needs of new enterprises.  Thus, as we presented above, enterprises at the stage of maturity have more 
chances to overcome crisis in comparison to new enterprises. 
7) As it already has been referred to the question “Banks based only on objective and countable 
criteria  for provide  funds  for an enterprise?”  micro enterprises  rejected  the  above state,  while all 
medium enterprises approved it. The results are depicted at the figure 2, below. 
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8) In the question “Do banks support SMEs?” the bigger the enterprises are the more they consider 
thatbanks support SMEs. At figure 3 below we portray the results
















































































































It is common sense that Greece is in the middle of the greatest post-war financial recession. While the 
awful crisis, banks do not foster enough to enterprises.
Credit  institutions  having  totally adopted  the policy  to  reduce  risks,  cooperate  mainly  with those 
enterprises which are very credible. In connection with the fact that financial turmoil had severely
affected SMEs, banks decreasing the fund providing to the market resulted in the deterioration of the 
recession. 
Taking under consideration to the fact that Greek government provides guarantee funds to enterprises 
and it is going to provide more 30 billion Euros, there has to be existed a system consisting of lower 
barriers towards loanable funds to more firms. At the recent past, the use of non-interest funds by 
businessmen who never received other kinds of loan did not help liquidity to be transferred to real 
economy. Taking under consideration the moral risk, state should reassign the terms of guarantee 
funds. 
Crisis is deeper at the poor regions of our Country. As motives while on crisis can not be more 
essential, the underdevelopment area of Serres  will never be development.
It is common sense that the existing wide network of bank branches contributes to the supporting of 
SMEs and simultaneously contributes to regional development. Taking under consideration to the fact 
that  banks  aim  to  reduce  the existing  wide  network  of  bank  branches we  suppose  that  banks 
contribution to regional development will come to an end. 
Coming to an end it is to be deducted that for decades, banks contribution on the fostering of SMEs 
was significant. Nowadays, it is doubtful whether banks continue to support SMEs and play their 
social role in Greece.17
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